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SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE:
FAIR TRIALS, CRUEL PUNISHMENT, AND ETHICAL
LAWYERING—OCTOBER 2009 TERM
Richard Klein*
The last Term of the Supreme Court included important issues
regarding the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. In Skilling
v. United States, 1 the Court considered a claim by a criminal defendant that the venue of his trial should have been changed because of
the extensive publicity surrounding the case. 2 The Court in Padilla v.
Kentucky 3 evaluated a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
based on the defense attorney’s affirmative misadvice regarding deportation. 4 In Graham v. Florida, 5 the Court considered the issue of
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as applied to a juvenile sentenced to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole. 6 United States v. Comstock 7 presented the
Court with an opportunity to expound on the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause regarding a Congressional statute allowing
the federal government to civilly commit “sexually dangerous” convicts after their sentences ended. 8 Finally, Holland v. Florida 9 allowed the Court to clarify a circuit split regarding equitable tolling

* Bruce K. Gould Distinguished Professor of Law, Touro Law Center; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1972. This Article is based on a presentation given at the Twenty-Second Annual
Leon D. Lazer Supreme Court Review held in Central Islip, New York on November 5,
2010.
1
130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
2
Id. at 2907.
3
130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
4
Id. at 1478.
5
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
6
Id. at 2020.
7
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
8
Id. at 1954.
9
130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
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under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 10
I.

SKILLING V. UNITED STATES: PUBLICITY, PARTIALITY, AND
PROSPECTIVE JURORS

Skilling v. United States 11 concerns a criminal defendant’s
Sixth Amendment 12 right to a trial by an impartial jury.13 Jeffrey
Skilling was the Chief Executive Officer of the now-defunct Texasbased corporation, Enron. 14 As a result of his dealings with the former energy giant, Skilling was charged with “conspiracy, securities
fraud, making false representations to auditors, and insider trading.” 15
At the time that Skilling was working for Enron, the corporation was the seventh highest revenue-grossing company in the United
States. 16 Fortune rated Enron as the most innovative large company
in America in the year 2000. 17 That same year, the company’s stock
price soared to over $83 per share. 18 In 2001, while Enron was flourishing, Skilling resigned as CEO for personal reasons and was replaced by his future co-defendant, Kenneth Lay. 19 Within four
months, Enron collapsed into bankruptcy. 20 In those four months, internal communications expressed concerns relating to the company’s
accounting procedures. 21 A closer look into the accounting showed
massive bookkeeping and financial maneuvers which concealed
10

Id. at 2560.
130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
12
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” (emphasis added)).
13
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907.
14
Id. See also ENRON, http://www.enron.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (describing
Enron’s collapse as “one of the largest and most complex bankruptcies in U.S. history”).
15
United States v. Skilling (Skilling I), 554 F.3d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 2009). “The indictment charged Skilling with one count of conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud,
fourteen counts of securities fraud, four counts of wire fraud, six counts of making false representations to auditors, and ten counts of insider trading.” Id. at 542.
16
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907.
17
Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2003).
18
Id. at 3. This was an eighty-seven percent increase over the year. Id.
19
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907; Healy & Palepu, supra note 17, at 4 exhibit 1.
20
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907.
21
Healy & Palepu, supra note 17, at 4 exhibit 1.
11
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Enron’s truly poor performance at the same time that the executive
board was attempting to “hype” Enron’s stock to unsustainable levels. 22 As a result of this information becoming public, major credit
rating agencies downgraded Enron’s stock, resulting in the former
“innovative company of the year” filing for bankruptcy. 23 Consequently in late 2001, the stock was worth just pennies per share. 24
The failure of Enron was subsequently linked to the actions of its executive board. 25
The city which was the hardest hit as a result of Enron’s collapse was Houston, Texas. 26 This catastrophic decline wiped out
many people’s life savings that were tied up in Enron’s stock. 27 Not
only did individuals lose massive amounts of personal investments,
but employees of the former energy giant also lost their jobs. 28 Many
of these former employees lived in Houston. 29 A media survey in
Houston was conducted before any trial began and revealed that residents perceived Jeffrey Skilling as a crook, money grubber, thief,
swindler, slimy rat, backstabber, terrorist, the devil, and the equivalent of an axe murderer. 30 These disparaging comments were typical
of the responses throughout the Houston community. 31
Skilling was alarmed that he would not be able to receive a
fair trial, and made a motion for a change of venue due to Enron’s location in Houston where the trial was set to occur. 32 In his motion,
he “contended that hostility toward him in Houston, coupled with ex22

Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907.
Healy & Palepu, supra note 17, at 4 exhibit 1.
24
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907.
25
Id. In 2004, a grand jury indicted Enron’s founder, Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, and
Enron’s former chief accounting officer, Richard Causey. Id. at 2907. The indictment read
that each “engaged in a wide-ranging scheme to deceive the investing public, including
Enron’s shareholders, . . . about the true performance of Enron’s businesses by: (a) manipulating Enron’s publicly reported financial results; and (b) making public statements and representations about Enron’s financial performance and results that were false and misleading.” Id. at 2908.
26
Id. at 2942 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
27
Skilling I, 554 F.3d at 560.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Joint App. Vol. 1 at 378a-79a, 416a, Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (No. 08-1394), 2009 WL
4825147.
31
Id.; Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2954 (“Houstonians compared Skilling to, among other
things, a rapist, an axe murderer, and an Al Qaeda terrorist.”).
32
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2908.
23
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tensive pretrial publicity, had poisoned potential jurors.” 33 Attached
to his motion was the independent media survey which showed that
the people in Houston were nine times more likely to have prejudged
the guilt of Jeffrey Skilling than those in the not-so-far-away city of
Phoenix, Arizona. 34 Respondents to the surveys from Houston were
asked, “What words come to mind when you hear the name Jeffrey
Skilling?”, and close to one-third of all responders used negative
and/or prejudicial words to describe him. 35 However, the trial court,
in accord with judges in two other Enron related cases, denied a
change of venue motion. 36
Each member of the potential jury pool, which was comprised
of several hundred persons, received a questionnaire. 37 The questionnaire consisted of a fourteen-page document with seventy-seven
questions for the purpose of weeding out biased individuals. 38 As a
result, the jury pool was reduced significantly. 39 However, three
weeks before voir dire was about to begin, one of Skilling’s codefendants, Richard Causey, entered a guilty plea. 40 News of the
plea was the front-page headline in the Houston Chronicle: “Causey’s
plea wreaks havoc for Lay, Skilling.” 41 The headline and accompanying article imparted even more negative publicity about Skilling
than had previously existed. 42 In fact, there had been over 4,000 ar33

Id.
Id.; Joint App. Vol. 1, supra note 30, at 378a.
35
Joint App. Vol. 1, supra note 30, at 401-02a. For a complete list of responses, see Joint
App. Vol. 1, supra note 30, at 416a.
36
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2908 n.2. See United States v. Howard, et al., No. 4:03-CR00093 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2004); United States v. Fastow, 292 F. Supp. 2d 914, 918 (S.D.
Tex. 2003). Therefore, “[t]hree judges residing in the [Houston] area . . . independently
found that defendants in Enron-related cases could obtain a fair trial in Houston.” Skilling,
130 S. Ct. at 2908 n.2.
37
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2909.
38
Id. The questionnaires asked a variety of questions such as: “Do you know anyone []
who has been negatively affected or hurt in any way by what happened at Enron? . . . Do you
have an opinion about the cause of the collapse of Enron? . . . Are you angry about what
happened with Enron? . . . Do you have an opinion [] about [] Jeffrey Skilling[?]” Id. at n.4
(internal quotation marks omitted).
39
Id. at 2909.
40
Id. However, as a result of Causey’s plea, the government dropped several counts
against Skilling that involved Skilling and Causey’s relationship. Skilling I, 554 F.3d at 542.
41
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2945-46 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
John C. Roper et al., Causey’s plea wreaks havoc for Lay, Skilling, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 28,
2005, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/enron/3553372.html.
42
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2910, 2945.
34

2011]

CRIMINAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE

153

ticles in the Houston Chronicle from the beginning of the Enron collapse in 2000 until the trial was about to commence in the year
2006. 43 After the news coverage of Causey’s plea, Skilling renewed
his motion for a change of venue. 44 In his motion, Skilling maintained that “[i]f Houston remained the trial venue, . . . jurors need to
be questioned individually by both the Court and counsel concerning
their opinions of Enron and ‘publicity issues.’ ” 45 The defendant’s
position in his motions was clear; the juror questionnaire was unreliable. The fact that a juror checks a box that states “I can be fair” is
not dispositive of the issue of fairness.46 Jurors have the ability to lie,
and certainly can act subconsciously and be influenced by factors that
they may not be aware of.
The trial judge again denied Skilling’s motion to change venue. 47 In the federal system, it is up to the judge whether voir dire is
conducted by the attorneys representing each party or by the judge
himself. 48 The trial court judge denied Skilling’s request for counselled voir dire. 49 The judge explained that,
I’ve found . . . I get more forthcoming responses from
potential jurors than the lawyers on either side. I don’t
know whether people are suspicious of lawyers—but I
think if I ask a person a question, I will get a candid
response much easier than if a lawyer asks the question. 50
However, to ease counsel’s concerns, the trial court promised to give
both sides the opportunity to ask potential jurors follow-up questions. 51
A second issue raised in Skilling’s motions was the potential
difficulty for any juror who may find Jeffrey Skilling to be “not
guilty,” to communicate that decision to the juror’s friends who
43

Id. at 2943 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2910.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 2918.
47
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2910.
48
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 (“The court may examine prospective jurors or may permit the
attorneys for the parties to do so.”).
49
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2910.
50
Id.
51
Id.
44
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might have lost their jobs or who might have lost their fortunes. 52
Essentially, Skilling maintained that jurors would feel community as
well as personal pressures to convict Jeffrey Skilling.
The trial judge, however, determined that a five hour time period in which to pick all the jurors was sufficient. 53 The trial lasted
approximately four months and after deliberating for five days, the
jury convicted Skilling on nineteen of the twenty-eight counts.54
Subsequently, Skilling was sentenced to twenty-four years incarceration. 55
In 2009, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted review of
Skilling’s conviction. 56 Among other things, Skilling contended
“that the community’s acrimony was so vitriolic that [the court]
should presume that it was impossible for him to receive a fair trial in
Houston. Second, he asserts that actual prejudice contaminated the
jury box.” 57 Reviewing the facts de novo, the court, in analyzing
“actual prejudice,” afforded great deference to the district court.58
Deference was required because “the determination of whether the
seated jury could remain impartial in the face of negative pretrial
publicity, and the measures that may be taken to ensure such impartiality, lay squarely within the domain of the trial court.” 59
However, the court acknowledged its duty to review the district court’s ruling as to whether the jury may have been biased and,
therefore, it would have constituted a manifest abuse of discretion for
the trial judge to allow the trial to occur. 60 The court determined that
there was a presumption of prejudice due to the volume of publicity
coupled with “the negative tone of media coverage generated by
Enron’s collapse.” 61 The Fifth Circuit further noted the prejudicial
effects of Causey’s guilty plea and Enron’s devastating effect on the

52

Id. at 2957 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2947.
54
Skilling I, 554 F.3d at 542. Skilling was convicted of conspiracy, securities fraud, making false statements, and insider trading. Id.
55
Id.
56
Skilling I, 554 F.3d 529.
57
Id. at 557.
58
Id. at 557-58.
59
Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1179 (10th Cir. 1998)).
60
Id.
61
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2911. See Skilling I, 554 F.3d at 558 (stating “[i]t would not have
been imprudent for the court to have granted Skilling’s transfer motion”).
53
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Houston community. 62 However, the court found that it was possible
to have overcome the potential prejudice. 63 “Although there is sufficient evidence here to raise a presumption of prejudice, the ‘presumption is rebuttable, . . . and the government may demonstrate from the
voir dire that an impartial jury was actually impanelled in appellant’s
case. If the government succeeds in doing so, the conviction will
stand . . . .’ ” 64 After examining the process of voir dire conducted
by the trial court, the court found that it was “proper and thorough.” 65
Skilling immediately appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 66 During oral arguments, Skilling claimed that “[t]he voir dire that the trial judge conducted was
essentially an ordinary voir dire for ordinary circumstances.” 67 Due
to the undeniable effect that Enron’s failure had on the Houston
community, the defense maintained that this process was surely deficient in both time and scope. 68 Skilling emphasized that “the entire
voir dire process in this [highly publicized] case [merely] took [five]
hours.” 69 Skilling compared the tragedy of the Oklahoma City
bombing case against Timothy McVeigh, which was transferred from
Oklahoma City to Denver, “but even after the transfer, the trial judge
conducted an [eighteen]-day voir dire.” 70 During oral argument, Justice Ginsberg differentiated Enron from Oklahoma City, stating that
life and limb was not involved in the downfall or a result of Enron. 71
62

Skilling I, 554 F.3d at 559-60.
Id. at 558.
64
Id. at 561 (quoting United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 250 (5th Cir. 1982)).
65
Id. at 562.
The district court here conducted an exemplary voir dire. After prescreening veniremembers based upon their responses to a fourteen-page
questionnaire, the parties mutually agreed to excuse 119 of them. The
court summoned the remaining veniremembers and explained the importance of an impartial jury. The court then asked whether “any of you
have doubts about your ability to conscientiously and fairly follow these
very important rules.”
Id. (emphasis omitted).
66
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 393 (2009) (writ of certiorari).
67
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (No. 08-1394), 2010 WL
710521.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 7.
70
Id. at 8-9. See United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1475 (W.D. Okla. 1996)
(venue moved).
71
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 67, at 9.
63
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Skilling maintained that the pretrial publicity had not only augmented
the passion and prejudice in the community, but was actually a symptom of that prejudice as well. 72 “[I]n conditions where you have the
level of passion and prejudice that permeated the Houston community, there’s too great a risk that the process of voir dire and particularly
the ordinary process of voir dire wouldn’t be successful” in finding
twelve unbiased jurors. 73 Essentially, the defense maintained that
Houston surely could have jurors who would not be biased, but the
likelihood of that was sharply diminished when the voir dire is limited in time and scope. 74 Justice Sotomayor, forecasting her position during the oral argument which was ultimately exhibited in her
dissenting opinion, asked the government: “With such a truncated
voir dire and one in which the judge basically said to the lawyers, I’m
not giving you much leeway at all, how can we be satisfied that there
was a fair and impartial jury picked . . . ?” 75 The oral argument
ended shortly after, and both parties awaited the Court’s ultimate
holding as to whether the pretrial publicity regarding the Enron scandal obstructed Skilling’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury.
The issues confronting the Court were “First, did the District
Court err by failing to move the trial to a different venue based on a
presumption of prejudice? Second, did actual prejudice contaminate
Skilling’s jury?” 76 In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the
Court upheld Skilling’s conviction, and further upheld the denial of
each of the defendant’s motions for a change of venue. 77 “The Sixth
Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to trial by an
impartial jury. By constitutional design, that trial occurs ‘in the State
where the . . . [c]rimes . . . have been committed.’ ” 78 The Court
noted that “The Constitution’s place-of-trial prescriptions, however,
do not impede transfer of the proceeding to a different district at the
defendant’s request if extraordinary local prejudice will prevent a fair
trial—a ‘basic requirement of due process.’ ” 79
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2912.
Id. at 2935.
Id. at 2912-13 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3).
Id. at 2913 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).

2011]

CRIMINAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE

157

The Court began its discussion where the Fifth Circuit’s analysis ended, the presumption of prejudice. 80 The Court found that
there was no need to have changed the venue and that the jurors’ familiarity with the case and their knowledge about the matter does not
mean that they are, in fact, impartial. 81 The Court stated that “[O]ur
decisions, . . . ‘cannot be made to stand for the proposition that juror
exposure to . . . news accounts of the crime . . . alone presumptively
deprives the defendant of due process.’ ” 82 The Court responded to
Skilling’s contentions regarding publicity and stated that it does not
automatically result in an unfair trial. 83
The Court analyzed prior cases in which it had reversed a
criminal defendant’s conviction due to the “utter corrupt[ion] by
press coverage.” 84 However, the Court distinguished those cases
from Skilling and provided four major explanations to counter Skil80

Id.
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2914-15 (“Prominence does not necessarily produce prejudice,
and juror impartiality, we have reiterated, does not require ignorance.”).
82
Id. at 2914 (quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975)).
83
Id. at 2916 (stating that “although news stories about Skilling were not kind, they contained no confession or other blatantly prejudicial information of the type readers or viewers
could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight”). Furthermore, the Court stated, “Although the widespread community impact necessitated careful identification and inspection
of prospective jurors’ connections to Enron, the extensive screening questionnaire and follow-up voir dire were well suited to that task.” Id. at 2917 (emphasis omitted).
84
See id. at 2913-15; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966) (“From
the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials
has become increasingly prevalent. Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by
an impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the
trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the
accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of the
circumstances. Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events
that transpire in the courtroom. But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial
news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat
abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity. In addition, sequestration of the jury was something the judge should have raised sua sponte with counsel. If
publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such
steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate
its function. Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the
fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.” (emphasis added)); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963).
81
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ling’s contention of presumed juror prejudice. 85 First, Houston has
over 4.5 million eligible veniremen, which surely meant that the possibility of finding twelve impartial jurors was feasible. 86 Secondly,
“although news stories about Skilling were not kind, they contained
no confession or other blatantly prejudicial information of the type
readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from
sight.” 87 Thirdly, four years had passed between Enron’s meltdown
and Skilling’s prosecution. 88 The final point, “and of prime significance,” was that Skilling had been in-fact acquitted on nine charges
brought against him. 89 The acquittal of those charges, in essence, indicated to the majority that the jurors were not so biased as to preclude a fair trial. 90 As a result, the Court held that “news stories about
Enron did not present the kind of vivid, unforgettable information we
have recognized as particularly likely to produce prejudice, and Houston’s size and diversity diluted the media’s impact.” 91
The Court did give consideration to the possible impact of Richard Causey’s plea. 92 The plea may have caused some possible juror prejudice, but the district court took the appropriate steps to reduce that risk. 93 The Court had delayed Skilling’s trial by two weeks,
and inquired of the prospective jurors as to their knowledge of the
plea. 94 “Although publicity about a co[-]defendant’s guilty plea calls
for inquiry to guard against actual prejudice, it does not ordinarily—
and . . . it did not here—warrant an automatic presumption of prejudice.” 95
As to actual prejudice, the Court analyzed the issue of whether the voir dire was sufficient to narrow down the pool to jurors who
85

Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2915-16.
Id. at 2915.
87
Id. at 2916.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2916. (“ ‘The jury’s ability to discern a failure of proof of guilt of
some of the alleged crimes indicates a fair minded consideration of the issues and reinforces
our belief and conclusion that the media coverage did not lead to the deprivation of [the]
right to an impartial trial.’ ” (quoting United States v. Arzola-Amaya, 867 F.2d 1504, 1514
(5th Cir. 1989))).
91
Id. (emphasis added).
92
Id. at 2917.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2917.
86
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could be fair and objective. 96 The Court emphasized that there
should be great deference to the trial judge in jury selection. 97 There
is “[n]o hard-and-fast formula dictat[ing] the necessary depth or
breadth of voir dire.” 98 The trial judge is able to look at the jurors
face-to-face when they are being questioned, and if that trial judge
makes the determination that those jurors can be fair and impartial,
then that decision should be one which receives deference by an appellate court. 99 The Court held that Skilling failed to show how the
voir dire fell short of the constitutional requirements guaranteed to
him under the Sixth Amendment. 100
In sum, Skilling failed to establish that a presumption
of prejudice arose or that actual bias infected the jury
that tried him. Jurors, the trial court correctly comprehended, need not enter the box with empty heads in
order to determine the facts impartially. “It is sufficient if the juror[s] can lay aside [their] impression[s]
or opinion[s] and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” 101
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Sotomayor, the only member of
the bench who had served as a trial judge, characterized the voir dire
in Skilling as superficial and relying too much on the potential jurors’
assurances that they could be impartial. 102 She further opined that
one cannot conclude that the jurors were free of the deep-seated animosity which had been affecting many of the people who lived in
Houston. 103 Sotomayor stated that the more intense the antipathy that
exists in a certain community towards a defendant, the more thorough
the voir dire process must be. 104 In Skilling, it was necessary for voir
96

Id.
Id. (stating “[j]ury selection, we have repeatedly emphasized, is particularly within the
province of the trial judge” (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1976) (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
98
Id. at 2917 (emphasis omitted).
99
Id. at 2918. “We conclude, in common with the Court of Appeals, that Skilling’s fairtrial argument fails; Skilling, we hold, did not establish that a presumption of juror prejudice
arose or that actual bias infected the jury that tried him.” Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907.
100
Id. at 2923.
101
Id. at 2925 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961)).
102
Id. at 2942 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
103
Id.
104
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2942 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
97
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dire to be completed with exceptional care. 105 The voir dire should
have been probing instead of cursory; “it was critical for the District
Court to take ‘strong measures’ to ensure the selection of ‘an impartial jury free from outside influences.’ ” 106 Additionally, in regards to
the issue of Richard Causey’s plea that had taken place shortly prior
to the commencement of the voir dire, Sotomayor concluded that
there was not sufficient questioning of the jurors as to their reactions
to the fact that one of Jeffrey Skilling’s co-defendants had pled guilty
so shortly before the trial was to begin. 107 Lastly, in regards to the
majority’s focus on the jury acquitting Skilling on nine charges, Sotomayor points out that those charges dealt with somewhat of a peripheral matter. 108 She stated that the prosecutor for the government
knew that these charges were weak and he, in fact, did not even focus
on these counts during his summation. 109 As a result, Sotomayor disagreed with the majority that just because the jurors did acquit on
those charges, it led to an inference that they were not biased on the
nineteen counts for which they had actually convicted Jeffrey Skilling. 110
Skilling has made it clear that a change of venue is difficult
for a defendant to obtain. The trial judge is granted great deference
in determining whether a jury has the ability to be impartial. When
the publicity has focused more on an event than on the specific defendant’s involvement, the chances of attaining a venue change are
diminished. 111 The Court’s determination, that the pretrial publicity
about Enron lacked “the kind of vivid, unforgettable information” required for a change in venue, is surely likely to be cited in the fu105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at 2953.
Id. at 2956 (quoting Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362).
Id. at 2957.
Id. at 2963.
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2963 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
This argument, however, mistakes partiality with bad faith or blind vindictiveness. Jurors who act in good faith and sincerely believe in their
own fairness may nevertheless harbor disqualifying prejudices. Such jurors may well acquit where evidence is wholly lacking, while subconsciously resolving closer calls against the defendant rather than giving
him the benefit of the doubt.

Id.
111

Id. at 2916 n.17 (citing United States v. Hueftle, 687 F.2d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir.
1982)).
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ture. 112
II.

PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AND THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVING PREJUDICE

“[T]here is no right more essential than the right to the assistance of counsel.” 113 The right to counsel is a precondition of a fair
trial, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 114 Therefore, “the active
participation of defense counsel in the entire criminal process is crucial for the functioning and fairness of the adversary system. If the
criminal process loses its adversarial character, the constitutional
guarantee is violated.” 115 “It is [the Court’s] responsibility under the
Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant—whether a citizen
or not—is left to the mercies of incompetent counsel.”116 In Padilla
v. Kentucky, 117 the issue was whether the failure of an attorney to advise his client of deportation constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation. 118
Padilla is a case which has, perhaps, not had as much impact
on a defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel as some
might have thought it would have had. 119 However, it is a crucial de112

See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978).
114
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). The Court further expanded the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it held that no defendant could be incarcerated,
even for a misdemeanor conviction, unless he had been provided counsel to assist in his defense. Id.
115
Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 627
(1986) (citations omitted).
116
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
117
130 S. Ct. 1473.
118
Id. at 1478.
119
See Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right To
Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 34 CHAMPION 18, 19 (2010) (“Padilla may turn out to be the most important right to counsel case since Gideon”). For further
analysis on Gideon, see Klein, supra note 115. See also Evangeline Pittman, Padilla v. Kentucky: Immigration Consequences Due to the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 5 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 93, 103 (2009); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively
Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95
IOWA L. REV. 119, 124, 194 (2009). In no way does this statement detract from the import of
this decision. It is merely taking into account the cases post-Padilla where most courts have
refused to extend Padilla’s holding to other collateral consequences. See infra note 219 and
accompanying text.
113
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cision which requires criminal defense attorneys to take certain precautions when representing a defendant. 120
Jose Padilla is an immigrant from Honduras who lived in the
United States of America as a lawful resident for over forty years. 121
Mr. Padilla had served in the United States Armed Forces during the
years of the Vietnam War and eventually received an honorable discharge. 122 In 2001, Padilla was arrested and charged with transporting more than one thousand pounds of marijuana in a tractortrailer. 123 Padilla soon conferred with his court-appointed attorney,
and after learning of a plea offer, Padilla asked his attorney what the
consequences of pleading guilty would be. 124 Padilla’s lawyer assured him that he “did not have to worry about immigration status
since he had been in the country so long.” 125 Subsequently, Padilla,
with the assistance of his defense attorney, pled guilty and received a
sentence of five years incarceration. 126 Unbeknownst to Padilla, under the Immigration and Nationalization Act, the transport of marijuana is considered an “aggravated felony.” 127 Due to this plea and the
mandatory provisions of the Immigration and Nationalization Act,
Padilla faced deportation. 128
When it comes to the mandatory deportation of someone who
enters a guilty plea to drug possession in federal court, the law is not

120

See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.
122
Id.; Padilla v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001981-MR, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 98,
at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006).
123
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 31, Padilla,
130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2509223.
124
Padilla, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 98, at *2-3.
125
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483
(Ky. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126
Id.; Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
127
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 n.1. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227 (a)(2)(B)(i) (West 2010), which
states in relevant part:
Any alien . . . in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order
of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is . . . . [a]ny alien who
at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the
United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . .
other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of
[thirty] grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.
128
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
121
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complex. 129 Deportation occurs—with the exception of some minor
marijuana cases—automatically. 130 Padilla’s lawyer would not have
had to spend an extensive amount of time determining what the immigration statutes and regulations were; it was an easy, clear-cut matter. 131
On appeal, Padilla argued ineffective assistance of counsel. 132
Padilla claimed two different prongs in which a court should have
found that his attorney lacked effectiveness. 133 First, Padilla’s lawyer
never told him that he could be deported as a result of his guilty plea,
and certainly never informed him that such deportation was mandatory once he entered this plea. 134 Secondly, not only did his lawyer not
tell him that he would be deported, but his lawyer engaged in what is
termed “affirmative misadvice.” 135 Padilla insisted that because of
his attorney’s nonfeasance, he pleaded guilty to the drug charges; if
he had known of the mandatory consequences, he would have insisted on proceeding to trial. 136 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky
held that a hearing was mandated which required further analysis into
whether Padilla’s “counsel’s wrong advice regarding deportation
could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” 137
However, when the state appealed the court of appeal’s decision, the Supreme Court of Kentucky denied Padilla’s claim, concluding that “the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from erroneous
advice about deportation because it is merely a ‘collateral’ consequence of his conviction.” 138 As a result, Padilla filed a writ requesting the Supreme Court resolve the issue. 139

129
Id. at 1483. Since 1922, narcotics offenses have provided a distinct-basis for deportation. Id. at 1479 n.4; Chung Que Fong v. Nagle, 15 F.2d 789, 789-90 (9th Cir. 1926) (stating
that narcotics offenses can trigger deportation).
130
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 n.1.
131
Id. at 1483.
132
Padilla, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 98, at *1.
133
Id. at *2-3.
134
Id. at *3.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Padilla, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 98, at *9.
138
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485).
139
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2008 WL
4933628.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari.140 During oral argument, Padilla’s counsel claimed that any misadvice given by a defendant’s attorney should be governed by the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance. 141 Concerned that the position may encompass
all consequences of misadvice, the Justices became cautious as to the
extent that the defendant was maintaining that the Sixth Amendment
protection applied. 142 In fact, Justice Scalia summed up the issue,
which turned out to be the most controversial matter post-Padilla,
stating: “[W]e have to decide whether we are opening a Pandora’s
box here, whether there is any sensible way to restrict it . . . to deportation.” 143 As the oral argument proceeded, the government reminded the Court that in Brady v. United States, 144 the Court defined
a “voluntary plea as a plea entered by one possessing full knowledge
of direct consequences.” 145 The government explained that a problem exists when you take the definition of “voluntary” from Brady
and insert a claim of misadvice.146 The government argued that some
court decisions “fail to focus again on ‘voluntary,’ . . . meaning full
knowledge of direct consequences, and instead reached out to these
kind of results-driven opinions that are kind of fueled by this feeling
. . . of unfairness” for the defendant not to know of the immigration
consequences. 147
Shifting to the matter of what comprises a collateral or a direct consequence, the Justices inquired as to where the line between
the two is drawn, and when something is so important that the defendant must know of it before any plea is entered. 148 The government
140

Padilla v. Kentucky, 129 S. Ct. 1317 (2009).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL
3268429.
142
Id. at 4.
143
Id. at 7.
144
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
145
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 35, 42. See also Brady, 397 U.S. at
755.
146
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 42.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 45. Courts have held that certain consequences of conviction categorized as
“collateral” include:
effects on custody such as revocation of parole or probation, ineligibility
for parole, civil commitment, civil forfeiture, consecutive rather than
concurrent sentencing, higher penalties based on repeat offender laws,
and registration requirements. Also usually deemed collateral are effects
on civil status such as disenfranchisement, ineligibility to serve on a
141
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defined a collateral consequence as a consequence that “falls under
the discretion or power of the sentencing court.” 149 In regards to Padilla, should deportation, even if a collateral consequence, be treated
differently due to the importance to the defendant? 150 Recognizing
this quandary, Justice Ginsburg stated that “ultimately, there is a potential problem in treating deportation differently than other collateral
consequences.” 151 Furthermore, she looked at Padilla’s argument and
stated:
But that is to suggest that it’s so important in all situations and it is more important than collateral consequence[s] that may affect citizens. Citizens will lose
the right to vote. They will lose their right to jury service, perhaps lose custody of their children. And
there’s no principled reason to really treat deportation
differently. If the reason to treat it differently because
it is viewed as so severe, it’s truly then a subjective
inquiry as what collateral consequence is severe to this
client. And it ultimately, prefers a class of citizens—
those who are non-citizens—over citizens who may
have just as much importance placed on collateral
consequences they face. 152
In the final question of oral argument, Justice Alito asked Padilla’s counsel to clarify where the line should be drawn in regards to
the Sixth Amendment encompassing other collateral consequences. 153
In his response, the counselor reminded the Court of Padilla’s position that no lines should be drawn; the Sixth Amendment should be
jury, disqualification from public benefits, and ineligibility to possess
firearms. The same is true for deprivations with tremendous practical
consequences, such as deportation, dishonorable discharge from the
armed services, and loss of business or professional licenses.
Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 705-06 (2002).
149
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 45.
150
Id. at 6.
151
Id. at 49.
152
Id. at 49-50.
153
Id. at 54 (“Which, if any, of the following would you not put in the same category as
advice about immigration consequences: advice about consequences for a conviction for a
sex offense, the loss of professional licensing or future employment opportunities, civil liability, tax liability, right to vote, right to bear arms[?]”).
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applied to all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on a case-bycase basis. 154
In an opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, the Court traced
its history of analyzing the effectiveness of counsel that began with
McMann v. Richardson. 155 In McMann, the Court held that the assistance of counsel meant there had to be “effective” assistance of counsel. 156 Additionally, in Hill v. Lockhart, 157 the Court applied the effective assistance of counsel to the plea process.158 In Hill, a criminal
defendant claimed that due to his attorney misadvising him as to the
effect his plea would have on his parole eligibility, the plea was improper and a violation of his Sixth Amendment right had therefore
occurred. 159 However, the Court had concluded that Mr. Hill had not
shown how the attorney’s actions prejudiced the defendant to a point
where his constitutional rights were violated. 160 Therefore, as a result
of Hill, a lawyer for the defendant had to be effective at the time the
accused was entering a plea in regards to direct consequences. 161 In
Padilla, however, the Court for the first time applied the criteria
which arose from Strickland v. Washington 162 to the issue of whether
misadvice by an attorney on an uncategorized consequence of a
guilty plea could be the genesis of a Sixth Amendment violation. 163
Generally, when a defendant claims that his attorney’s ineffective assistance of counsel led him to plead guilty, the defendant must then
satisfy the Strickland test. 164
The Court in Strickland had held that even if the defense
counsel was lacking in performance and the errors that were made
were so serious that counsel’s action departed from the guarantee of
the Sixth Amendment, “a conviction should not be reversed unless
the defendant shows ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for

154

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 54 (“[O]ur principal position is that
the Court should not draw lines, that that’s the whole purpose of Strickland.”).
155
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477, 1480-81; Richardson, 397 U.S. 759.
156
Richardson, 397 U.S. at 771.
157
474 U.S. 52 (1985).
158
Id. at 58.
159
Id. at 53-55.
160
Id. at 60.
161
Id.
162
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
163
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. See also Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
164
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Klein, supra note 115, at 640.
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counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.’ ” 165 For a defendant to successfully bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court instituted a test.166
Under this two-prong approach, the defendant must prove: (1) deficient performance by the trial attorney, (2) which resulted in sufficient prejudice to the defendant. 167 Furthermore, since Strickland’s
inception, this test has been seen as an extremely high burden for petitioners to show that they have received ineffective assistance of
counsel. 168
The Court, in discussing the first prong of the required twoprong test, sent a clear message to lower courts that there is a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct was constitutionally adequate. 169
However, the Court did not apply the distinction between collateral
and direct consequences and only stated that “[b]ecause of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation [of ineffective assistance of
counsel], a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 170 In fact, until the Padilla decision, “the longstanding and
unanimous position of the federal courts was that reasonable defense
counsel generally need only advise a client about the direct consequences of a criminal conviction.” 171
The Court in Padilla did not categorize the deportation consequences of the plea as either direct or collateral. 172 It was the first
time that the Court had looked at Strickland and whether ineffective
assistance of counsel applied to a matter outside the parameters of the
prosecution or actual sentence, in this instance one that would automatically result from the judge’s sentencing.173 “We conclude that
advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the
ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to
165

Klein, supra note 115, at 640 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
166
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. See Klein, supra note 115, at 640.
167
Id.
168
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” (emphasis added)).
169
See id.
170
Id. at 689 (emphasis added).
171
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring).
172
Id. at 1481.
173
See Love & Chin, supra note 119, at 18.
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Padilla’s claim.” 174
Because the Court had determined to apply Strickland, the issue necessary to resolve was whether the lawyer acted reasonably
under prevailing professional norms. 175 The Supreme Court referred
to the American Bar Association and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association for the requirements and obligations of a defense
attorney. 176 Furthermore, the Court cited a law professor’s amicus
brief: “[A]uthorities of every stripe—including the American Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender organizations, authoritative treatises, and state and city bar publications—universally require defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation
consequences for non-citizen clients . . . .” 177
It was clear to the Court that under these standards, a lawyer
has an obligation to inform his or her non-citizen clients about the
risk of deportation. 178 Additionally, the Court stated that the Immigration and Nationalization Act was “succinct, clear, and explicit in
defining the removal consequence for Padilla’s conviction.” 179 As a
result, the Court stated that Padilla’s counsel could have easily determined that the consequence of pleading guilty would lead to Padil174

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
Id. See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
176
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (“We long have recognized that ‘[p]revailing norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to
determining what is reasonable.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Bobby v. Van Hook, 130
S. Ct. 13, 16 (2009))). But see Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1146 (1999) (showing the complete turnaround from
the time of Strickland’s decision, where the Court outright refused to adhere to the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards). “Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice . . . are guides to
determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
177
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Legal Ethics,
Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 12-14, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1556546).
178
Id. at 1483. Additionally it is clear to defender services across the country:
The Court may be concerned that if defense counsel must advise their
clients about immigration consequences of convictions, such a ruling
would impose an undue burden on those attorneys—straining resources
or detracting from other essential duties. Amici are as sensitive as anyone to the concerns that arise when new obligations are added to those
we already have undertaken. Yet we are united in our belief that these
obligations are not only appropriate, but essential.
Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al. at 22, Padilla, 130 S.
Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1567356 (2009).
179
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(b)(i).
175
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la’s deportation, and that “his counsel’s advice was incorrect.” 180
“[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this
case” there is such an obligation that a constitutionally competent
lawyer must tell non-citizen clients about the risk of deportation. 181
The Supreme Court did not find it necessary to distinguish between a direct and collateral consequence. 182 In fact, the Court noted
that it had “never applied a distinction . . . to define the scope of constitutionally reasonable professional assistance under Strickland.” 183
What was of significance was that the Court considered the deportation consequence to be of a “unique nature,” 184 and as “intimately related to the criminal process” and “nearly an automatic result” following certain criminal convictions or pleas. 185
In order for a plea to be assumed as completely voluntary, one
ought to have knowledge of the consequences of that plea. 186 A lawyer has the obligation to advise his or her client of the desirability of
the plea. 187 This obligation requires that the lawyer understand the
ramifications of the plea, as well as the ability to explain to the lawyer’s client the implications of the plea.188 The Court in Padilla
stated that a holding limited to Padilla’s affirmative misadvice claim
would invite untenable results. 189 First, the Court stated that “it
would give counsel an incentive to remain silent on matters of great
importance,” and secondly, “it would deny a class of clients least able
to represent themselves the most rudimentary advice on deportation
even when it is readily available.” 190 The Court noted that Strickland’s test applies to all of Padilla’s claims. 191 Furthermore, the
Court stated that “professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation conse180

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
Id.
182
Id. at 1481.
183
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
184
Id. “We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe penalty.” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
185
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
186
Brady, 397 U.S. at 755.
187
Klein, supra note 115, at 669-72.
188
Id.
189
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 1482.
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quences of a client’s plea. We should, therefore, presume that counsel satisfied their obligation to render competent advice at the time
their clients considered pleading guilty.” 192
In sum, the Court applied the test of Strickland to Padilla, acknowledging the importance and critical nature of the plea bargain
and negotiation process under the Sixth Amendment’s constitutional
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. “The severity of deportation⎯‘the equivalent of banishment or exile,’⎯only underscores
how critical it is for counsel to inform her non[-]citizen client that he
faces a risk of deportation.” 193 In its final paragraphs of the opinion
the Court stated:
It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure
that no criminal defendant—whether a citizen or not—
is left to the “mercies of incompetent counsel.” . . .
[W]e now hold that counsel must inform her client
whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Our
longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on
families living lawfully in this country demand no
less.
Taking as true the basis for his motion for postconviction relief, we have little difficulty concluding
that Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel
was constitutionally deficient. Whether Padilla is entitled to relief will depend on whether he can demonstrate prejudice as a result thereof, a question we do

192

Id. at 1485 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Id. at 1486 (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)). In regards
to the changes to immigration laws over the years the Court stated its position on the effect
of removal consequences:
The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of
crimes has never been more important. These changes confirm our view
that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part—indeed,
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed
on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480. See Brief for Amici Curiae Asian American Justice Center et al.
at 12-27, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1567358, for real world examples
of the high significance and importance of facing deportation.
193
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not reach because it was not passed on below. 194
The Court in Padilla, therefore, only applied the first prong of
the Strickland test; 195 the second prong of the analysis would be to
determine whether there was prejudice. 196 In the context of Padilla,
this meant that the defendant would not have entered the plea of
guilty had he known that he would be automatically deported by entering the plea. “[T]o obtain relief [on a claim that an attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise a defendant
on the consequences of a guilty plea], a petitioner must convince the
court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” 197 This question was remanded to
the Kentucky courts for further review. 198
In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts focused on the clear affirmative misadvice by Padilla’s lawyer
when the lawyer told Padilla that he “did not have to worry about
immigration status since he had been in the country so long.” 199 Both
Justices agreed that this constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 200 However, they concluded that Padilla’s lawyer’s lack of
knowledge of the immigration consequences of the plea, was not, in
and of itself, ineffective. 201
In somewhat of an “I do not know nothing” kind of advice,
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts agreed that an attorney should
therefore mention to the clients that there might be immigration consequences. 202 “[I]f the alien wants advice on this issue [of deportation], the alien should consult an immigration attorney. I do not
agree with the Court that the attorney must attempt to explain what
those consequences may be.” 203 The basis for this concern is that
criminal defense attorneys’ expertise is not immigration law, and the
194

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486-87 (quoting Richardson, 397 U.S. at 771).
Id. at 1483.
196
Id. at 1483-84.
197
Id. at 1485 (emphasis added).
198
Id. at 1483-84.
199
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487-88 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
200
Id. at 1487.
201
Id. at 1487, 1494 (“In sum, a criminal defense attorney should not be required to provide advice on immigration law, a complex specialty that generally lies outside the scope of
a criminal defense attorney’s expertise.”).
202
Id. at 1494.
203
Id. at 1487.
195
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Court’s holding is unrealistically asking them—and furthermore expecting them—to provide sufficient advice in an area of law in which
they likely have limited experience. 204 Justice Alito cautions the
Court that this “vague, halfway test” will surely lead to confusion
amongst the courts and cause widespread litigation. 205 “This case
happens to involve removal, but criminal convictions can carry a
wide variety of consequences other than conviction and sentencing
. . . .” 206 These other consequences “are serious, but this Court has
never held that a criminal defense attorney’s Sixth Amendment duties
extend to providing advice about such matters.” 207 In conclusion to
the concurrence, both Justices agree, “When a criminal defense attorney is aware that a client is an alien, the attorney should advise the
client that a criminal conviction may have adverse consequences under the immigration laws.” 208 However, the attorney should tell the
client that if you want a clear answer on this collateral issue, you
should speak with an immigration lawyer to get the complete ramifications of any guilty plea. 209
In their dissent, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas concluded
that in a perfect world, a lawyer would understand and explain to his
or her client the consequences of the plea, but that the Constitution is
not the tool to create the “best of all possible worlds.” 210 Furthermore, both Justices stated that there is no Sixth Amendment right to
counsel on a collateral issue such as is raised in Padilla. 211 Justices
Thomas and Scalia refer to the point that Justice Alito opined in his
concurrence, “A criminal conviction can carry a wide variety of consequences other than conviction and sentencing . . . .” 212 As a result
of the Court’s holding in Padilla, Thomas and Scalia express concern
that there is “no logical stopping-point” to adding obligations for

204

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487-88 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1487.
206
Id. at 1488.
207
Id. at 1488. See supra note 148 for a list of collateral consequences.
208
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1494 (Alito, J., concurring).
209
Id. at 1487, 1494.
210
Id. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting). “The Constitution, however, is not an all-purpose
tool for judicial construction of a perfect world; and when we ignore its text in order to make
it that, we often find ourselves swinging a sledge where a tack hammer is needed.” Id.
211
Id. at 1494.
212
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 (quoting Justice Alito).
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which a defense attorney must provide advice. 213
In its conclusion, the dissent maintained that the correct way
to handle the problems raised in the Padilla case would have been
through the legislature. 214 “Statutory provisions can remedy these
concerns in a more targeted fashion, and without producing permanent, and legislatively irreparable, overkill.” 215 However, due to the
majority’s holding, this form of relief “has been precluded in favor of
[the Court’s] sledge hammer.” 216
The holding in Padilla is an exceptional one in that a finding
by appellate courts that trial counsel has been ineffective is rare indeed. 217 However, courts for the most part have declined to extend
Padilla beyond the scope of immigration consequences. 218 Additionally, these courts seem to be stating that Padilla determined that immigration consequences were in fact, direct consequences, as opposed to being merely collateral, or at least in a new category
somewhere between the two. 219 Essentially, courts are finding that
immigration consequences are so closely tied to criminal convictions
that they require higher consideration than other collateral consequences such as sex offender registration or DMV consequences. 220
213

Id.
Id. at 1496-97.
215
Id. at 1495.
216
Id. at 1497.
217
Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, supra note 176,
at 1446.
218
See Cox v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-000176-MR, 2010 WL 3927704, at *6 (Ky.
Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2010). But cf. Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 389 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)
(“[W]e conclude that the failure to advise a client that pleading guilty will require him to
register as a sex offender is constitutionally deficient performance, and the trial court erred
in holding otherwise.”); Pridham v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-002190-MR, 2010 WL
4668961, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010) (“In light of the decision in Padilla, we conclude that gross misadvice concerning parole eligibility may amount to ineffective assistance
of counsel worthy of post-conviction relief.”).
219
See State v. Salazar, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0296-PR, 2011 WL 285554, at *2 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Jan. 19, 2011) (“[Padilla’s] holding related only to claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.”); People v. Duffy, 902 N.Y.S.2d 805, 808 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (“The Supreme
Court of the United States has not distinguished between direct and collateral consequences
in defining the scope of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court stated in Padilla . . . [that] it is uniquely difficult to classify [deportation] as either a direct or collateral
consequence.”).
220
See Cox, 2010 WL 3927704, at *6 (“Hence, even though the holding in Padilla specifically refers to deportation measures, which are unique because they are so intimately related
to the underlying criminal conviction, it apparently does not extend to other collateral consequences.”); Duffy, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
214
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Some jurisdictions, however, have used language which
seems to indicate that there may be room to extend Padilla to these
other collateral consequences. 221 In People v. Gravino, 222 for example, the court stated “there may be cases in which a defendant can
show that he pleaded guilty in ignorance of a consequence that, although collateral for purposes of due process, was of such great importance to him that he would have made a different decision had that
consequence been disclosed” by his attorney. 223
There certainly has been at least one very significant ramification of the Padilla holding: the creation of CLE programs to train
criminal defense counsel in the fundamentals of immigration law.224
Some public defender offices have hired lawyers with extensive immigration experience to handle cases for those defendants who are
not United States citizens. 225 But some prosecutors’ offices have responded by requiring defendants to waive their rights to know the
specific consequences of a possible plea. 226 The District of Arizona,
for example, has incorporated the following language into the fast
track plea agreement:
Defendant recognizes that pleading guilty may have
consequences with respect to the defendant’s immigration status if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States. Under federal law, a broad range of crimes
are removable offenses, including the offense(s) to
which defendant is pleading guilty. Removal and oth221

See People v. Gravino, 928 N.E.2d 1048, 1056 (N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 1048.
223
Id. at 1056.
224
See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky: Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions,
LAWLINE.COM, http://www.lawline.com/cle/course-details.php?i=1242 (last visited Feb. 19,
2011); Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenge to Georgia Criminal Defense Attorneys, COBB
COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SECTION 2010 CLE PROGRAM,
http://www.padillacentral.com/home/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/PadillaCLE012811.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011); Padilla v. Kentucky: Immigration Consequences of Criminal
Convictions, CITY BAR CENTER CLE, https://www.nycbar.org/CLE/pdf/10_10/100410_web.
pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
225
See NACDL, Supreme Court Upholds Integrity of Criminal Justice System for Immigrants, Mar. 31, 2010, http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/NewsReleases/2010mn08?OpenDoc
ument.
226
See Norman L. Reimer, The Padilla Decision: Was 2010 the Year Marking a Paradigm Shift in the Role of Defense Counsel—or Just More Business as Usual?, 34 CHAMPION
7, 7 (2010).
222

2011]

CRIMINAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE

175

er immigration consequences are subject to a separate
proceeding. However, defendant understands that no
one, including the defendant’s attorney or the district
court, can predict to a certainty the effect of the defendant’s conviction on the defendant’s immigration status. Defendant nevertheless affirms that the defendant
wants to plead guilty regardless of any immigration
consequences that the defendant’s plea may entail,
even if the consequence is the defendant’s automatic
removal from the United States. 227
And in what is a particularly noteworthy event, the Judicial
Function Committee of the American Bar Association’s Criminal
Justice Section recognized that lower level courts may have an obligation to act as a result of Padilla. 228 The Committee’s goal as stated
in August 2010 is as follows: “[W]e wish to explore a court’s obligation in light of Padilla v. Kentucky. Specifically, we will explore
what inquiry, if any, should be made of defense counsel and/or the
defendant at the time the plea is entered, to ensure that counsel has
fulfilled his or her obligation under Padilla.” 229
The author of this Article wrote twenty-five years ago of the
need, in light of the Court’s holding in Strickland, for greater specificity in the requirements for competent representation. 230
In light of the difficulties for a defendant who was
represented by an ineffective counsel in obtaining appellate relief, it is crucial that substantial efforts be
made to insure that counsel act effectively and competently at the trial level. If reviewing courts are going
to presume competency, then the profession must
clearly indicate to counsel what indeed must be done
to provide competent representation. 231
The holding in Padilla has been responsive to this concern.
227

Id.
See Judicial Function Committee, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION—CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION, http://www2.americanbar.org/sections/criminaljustice/CR190000/Pages/default.as
px (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
229
Id. (emphasis added)
230
See Klein, supra note 115, at 650.
231
Id.
228
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Although there has yet to be a significant expansion of the lawyer’s
obligation to instruct the client on the proliferating collateral issues
resulting from a plea, it will surely be most interesting to observe the
possible application of the Sixth Amendment to future cases concerning the substantial disabilities that may be found to “intimately relate[] to the . . . [underlying] criminal conviction[].” 232
III.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
a.

Background: Two Disproportionate Sentences and
the Eighth Amendment, Andrade and Ewing

Two Ninth Circuit cases, Lockyer v. Andrade 233 and Ewing v.
California, 234 decided by the Supreme Court on the same day in
2003, 235 illustrated an unwillingness of the Court to interfere with the
rights of individual states to determine appropriate punishments for
crimes. In both Andrade and Ewing, the defendants challenged the
constitutionality of California’s “three strikes” law, 236 which effectively imposed a sentence of twenty-five years to life for any defendant pursuant to his or her committing a third felony. Both Andrade
and Ewing, receiving life sentences rendered under the California statute for petty thefts, sought relief claiming that their convictions violated the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishments. 237
232

See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
538 U.S. 63 (2003).
234
538 U.S. 11 (2003).
235
The Supreme Court decided both cases on March 5, 2003. See Andrade, 538 U.S. 63;
Ewing, 538 U.S. 11.
236
In 1994, “California [] became the second State[, behind Washington,] to enact [the]
three strikes law.” Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15. Under the “three strikes” statutory scheme:
If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions . . . that have
been pled and proved, the term for the current felony conviction shall be
an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater of: (i) Three times the
term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions; (ii) Imprisonment in the state prison for [twenty-five] years.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 2003).
237
In Andrade, the defendant, on two dates in November 1995, stole videotapes from two
K-Mart stores worth, respectively $84.70 and $68.84. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 66. Among his
long list of offenses for which Andrade served jail time were three counts of first-degree residential burglary and a state court conviction for petty theft. Id. at 66-67. Andrade was
charged pursuant to the K-Mart thefts, with two counts of petty theft with a prior conviction,
233
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The Court, in both cases, held for the state of California. 238 In Ewing,
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion emphasized the Court’s
longstanding deference to state legislatures concerning the area of
punishment. 239 O’Connor stated, “[The Court’s] traditional deference
to legislative policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the
Constitution ‘does not mandate adoption of any one penological
theory.’ ” 240
Justice Souter, in his dissent in Andrade, sharply criticized the
Court for failing to recognize that cases like Andrade and Ewing
demonstrate the application of precedent set forth in Solem v.
Helm. 241 Expressing sharp disagreement with the majority’s holding
that the sentence against Andrade was not disproportionate, Souter
emphatically stated, “If Andrade’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no meaning.” 242

which counts as a “wobbler”—essentially, the prosecutor may charge a “wobbler” as either a
misdemeanor or a felony. Id. at 67. Here, the prosecutor chose to charge Andrade’s petty
theft with prior convictions as a felony, and, together with Andrade’s prior residential burglary felonies, led the judge to sentence him to two consecutive terms of life in imprisonment pursuant to the “three strikes” law. Id. at 67-68. In Ewing, the defendant, on parole in
2000, stole three golf clubs from a pro shop worth almost $1200. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17-18.
Because, like Andrade, Ewing had a string of serious felonies on his record, the judge decided to allow the golf club burglary (“wobbler”) to count as a felony for which Ewing was
sentenced to 25 years in prison. Id. at 18-20.
238
Andrade, 538 U.S. at 77 (rejecting Andrade’s reliance on settled law from Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S 263 (1980), arguing that his sentence was grossly disproportionate under the
Eighth Amendment; instead, the Court held that Andrade’s was not an “extraordinary” case
for those precedents to apply); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30 (holding that Ewing’s sentence of
twenty-five years to life, “imposed for the offense of felony grand theft under the three
strikes law, [was] not grossly disproportionate and therefore [did] not violate the Eighth
Amendment[ as a] prohibition [against] cruel and unusual punishment”). Id. at 30-31.
239
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24-28 (referring to California’s legitimate interest in deterring
crime).
240
Id. at 25 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999).
241
Andrade, 538 U.S. at 77 (Souter, J., dissenting). In Solem, the Court held that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole was grossly disproportionate to the crime of
$100 check fraud, even though the defendant had committed several prior felonies. 463 U.S.
at 279-81, 303. The Court in Solem developed an “objective proportionality test” to determine if a sentence is out of proportion to the crime, and, therefore in violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 290-92.
242
Andrade, 538 U.S. at 83.
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Graham v. Florida: Application of Cruel and
Unusual to Juvenile Offenders

Andrade and Ewing provide two examples in which the Court
decided cases regarding sentences that, at first blush, seemed grossly
disproportionate to the offenses that the defendants committed. Yet,
the Court held that each of these cases was not a violation of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 243 Last Term, the Court decided Graham v. Florida, 244 in
which the defendant faced the possibility of life in prison. The defendant in Graham was distinguishable from the defendants in both
Andrade and Ewing; Terrance Jamar Graham was sixteen when a
Florida judge originally sentenced him as an adult. 245
Under Florida law, a prosecutor has the discretion to charge
felony offenders age sixteen and seventeen as adults.246 In July 2003,
at the age of sixteen, Terrance Jamar Graham, with other teenagers,
engaged in a failed attempt to burglarize a restaurant during which
the restaurant manager was struck in the head with a metal instrument; Graham was subsequently arrested.247 Graham’s prosecutor,
pursuant to Florida statute, charged Graham as an adult with two felonies, one carrying the maximum penalty of life imprisonment. 248
Graham entered into a plea agreement and was sentenced to concurrent three year terms of probation; a twelve-month requirement to
serve in the county jail was set aside for time served awaiting trial. 249
Graham’s promise to the sentencing court to “turn [his] life
around” was short-lived. 250 Shortly after his release, and shortly be243

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution provides, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. See Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 679-81 (2005) (underscoring the “conceptual confusion over
the meaning of proportionality,” especially in light of the Ewing decision).
244
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
245
Id. at 2018.
246
See FLA. STAT. § 985.227(1)(b) (2003) (current version FLA. STAT. § 985.557(1)(b)
(2010)).
247
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
248
Id. (“The charges against Graham were armed burglary with assault or battery, a firstdegree felony carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, [] and attempted armed-robbery, a second-degree felony carrying a maximum of [fifteen] years’ imprisonment.”).
249
Id.
250
Id.
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fore his eighteenth birthday, Graham was again arrested and charged
with felony robbery. 251 A trial court subsequently found that Graham
violated his probation by engaging in further crimes while on probation. 252 At a subsequent sentencing hearing, Graham’s attorney requested five years of imprisonment, the Florida Department of Corrections recommended four years, and the prosecutor asked the court
to impose a sentence of thirty years.253 The trial court found Graham
guilty of the earlier charges which had occurred when he was sixteen,
admonished Graham for choosing a criminal path in life, and refused
to consider any further juvenile sanctions. 254 Graham was sentenced
to life in prison, and, because Florida has no parole, Graham had no
possibility of release. 255
Graham’s initial Eighth Amendment challenges to his sentence failed, and, eventually, the Florida Supreme Court ultimately
denied review. 256 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 257
Graham presented a case of first impression for the Court regarding the Eighth Amendment and cruel and unusual punishment—a
categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence. 258 Previously, the
Court had tackled categorical challenges in death penalty cases, and
determined that a certain sentence was inappropriate for all the members of a class of people. 259
251

Id. at 2018-19.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2019.
253
Id.
254
Id. at 2020. The trial court judge stated, “Given your escalating pattern of criminal
conduct, it is apparent to the Court that you have decided that this is the way you are going
to live your life and that the only thing I can do now is to try and protect the community
from your actions.” Id.
255
Id.
256
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020. The Florida District Court of Appeal noted the seriousness of Graham’s offenses, and stated, “[the offenses] were not committed by a pre-teen, but
a seventeen-year-old who was ultimately sentenced at the age of nineteen.” Id.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 2022. There are two categories of Eighth Amendment cases: (1) sentences involving disproportionality; and (2) cases using categorical rules. Id. at 2021-22. The Court
acknowledged that it had “used categorical rules to define Eighth Amendment standards”
before, but “[t]he previous cases in this classification involved the death penalty.” Graham,
130 S. Ct. at 2022. Unlike cases in which “a gross proportionality challenge to a . . . defendant’s sentence” is a suitable approach, here, “a sentencing practice itself is in question.” Id.
259
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008) (holding that the death penalty
for a non-homicidal crime is cruel and unusual); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
578-79 (2005) (holding that anyone under the age of eighteen at the time he or she committed the murder could not be sentenced to death); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318
252
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Historically, in adopting categorical rules, the Court has first
looked to “objective indicia of national consensus.” 260 Here, the
Court looked to the states to determine the contemporary attitude toward the imposition of a life sentence for a juvenile offender. 261 Of
the thirty-seven states that currently provide for a sentence of life
without parole for juvenile offenders, 262 only eleven states have imposed such a sentence. 263 After a detailed analysis of the practice of
sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, the Court determined
that, even though many states currently treat juveniles as adults under
certain circumstances for the purposes of punishment, “[t]he sentencing practice . . . is exceedingly rare.” 264 The Court cited its earlier
holding in Atkins v. Virginia 265 that “ ‘[I]t is fair to say that a national
consensus has developed against it.’ ” 266 However, “consensus [cannot stand alone as determining] whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual.” 267
The Court’s analysis continued by examining the penological
justifications of sentencing non-homicidal juvenile offenders to life
imprisonment without parole, and determined that “none of the goals
of penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate—
(2002) (determining that the death sentence was inappropriate for someone who was mentally retarded at the time he or she committed the crime); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 748
(2002) (holding that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits “barbaric” punishment); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (prohibiting the death penalty to
anyone under the age of 16); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (overturning a
Florida court death penalty sentence when the requisite mens rea of intent was not shown).
260
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
261
Id. The Court stated, “[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.” Id. (quoting Atkins,
536 U.S. at 312).
262
Id. at 2034-36 app.
263
Id. at 2024. “[T]here are 109 juvenile offenders serving sentences of life without parole . . . .” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (referring to a recent study by Paolo Annino, David
W. Rasmussen, and Chelsea Boehme Rice, Juvenile Life without Parole for Non-homicide
Offenses: Florida Compared to Nation, FSU COLL. OF LAW, PUB. LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO.
399, 2, 14 (2009). “A significant majority [of juveniles serving life sentences for nonhomicide offenses], [seventy-seven] in total, are serving . . . in Florida.” Graham, 130 S.
Ct. at 2024. “The [rest] are imprisoned in just ten states—California, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia.” Id.
264
Id. at 2025-26 (stating that “the many states that allow life without parole for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders but do not impose the punishment should not be treated as if they
have expressed the view that the sentence is appropriate”).
265
536 U.S. 304.
266
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).
267
Id.
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retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—provide[d]
an adequate justification.” 268 Even though penological goals may be
determined within the discretion of individual state legislatures, sentences that serve no legitimate penological goals are, by nature “disproportionate to the offense.” 269 Retribution, with respect to a minor,
has been held to be “ ‘not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed’ on the juvenile murderer.” 270 It logically followed that
imposing a sentence of life without parole for a non-homicide offense
serves no legitimate goal of retribution. General deterrence, with respect to juveniles, failed to justify the desired effect compared with
mature adults; “impetuous” juveniles lack “maturity and understanding,” and “are less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making decisions.” 271 The Court concluded that incapacitation, a legitimate reason to provide safety to the public by
preventing recidivism, had no justification for juvenile offenders because juvenile offenders may change and learn from their mistakes. 272 Additionally, the Court concluded that rehabilitation, administered through a system of parole, had no basis in Graham because
Florida rejected the possibility of parole, thereby rejecting rehabilitation as a penological goal. 273
The Court determined that, based on its finding of no legitimate penological goal for imposing a sentence of life without parole
268

Id. at 2028. The Court, in deciding whether sentencing a juvenile to life without parole
for a non-homicide offense, Graham, continually refers to Roper. In Roper, the defendant,
at seventeen, committed murder and, following his eighteenth birthday, was sentenced to
death. Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-56. The Missouri Supreme Court, establishing that the Constitution prohibits such a penalty, eventually set aside his death sentence and re-sentenced
him to life without parole. Id. at 559-60. The Court granted certiorari and affirmed, holding
that (1) as evidenced in sociological and scientific studies, “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are
more understandable among the young; these qualities often result in impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions”; (2) “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and (3) “the character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.” Id. at 569-70 (citations omitted). The
Court concluded that “These differences [between juveniles and adults] render suspect any
conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders” subject to the harshest penalty—
the sentence of death. Id. at 570.
269
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
270
Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571).
271
Id. at 2028-29 (stating that the “limited deterrent effect provided by life without parole
is not enough to justify the sentence”).
272
Id. at 2029 (making the comparison between adult offenders and juvenile offenders).
273
Id. at 2029-30.
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on a juvenile for a non-homicide offense, Graham’s sentence was
cruel and unusual for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment. 274 The
Court held that juvenile offenders lacked sufficient culpability to deserve such a severe sentence. 275 “A state is not required to guarantee
eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide
crime,” but a State may not forbid those offenders from ever reentering society. 276
The Court in Graham concluded with its controversial practice of analyzing penological practices of other countries with respect
to those of the United States. 277 The Court stressed that, although international practice is by no means binding on the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, the judgments of our nation, when consistent with those of other nations, provide reasonable and justifiable
support and respect for our decisions. 278 Here, the Court found that,
although eleven countries can sentence juvenile offenders to life
without parole, only the United States and Israel actually sentence juveniles to life without parole. 279 But even in Israel, the seven juvenile prisoners serving the sentence were convicted of either homicide
or attempted homicide, revealing that Israel did not exercise the option for non-homicide offenses. 280 Therefore, as a result of the
Court’s decision in Graham, the Unites States was in accord with in274

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
Id.
276
Id. (emphasis added).
277
Id. at 2033-34. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21;
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796 n.22; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 596 n.10 (1977); Trop v. 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958); Youngjae Lee, International
Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 63, 64-65
(2007) (discussing that, although not a new practice, comparing international legal practices
to constitutional principles has intensified in recent years, especially in light of controversial
cases—Roper, Lawrence v. Texas (homosexual sodomy and privacy rights), and Atkins
(mentally handicapped and the death penalty)); David T. Hutt & Lisa K. Parshall, Divergent
Views on the Use of International and Foreign Law: Congress and the Executive versus the
Court, 33 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 113, 115-16 (2007) (underscoring that the practice, although
long recognized in American jurisprudence, has not received overwhelming support because
it “might run the risk of overturning the American legal culture and American constitutionalism”); Julia Salvatore, Suparna Salil & Michael Whelan, Sotomayor and the Future of International Law, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 487, 487 (commenting that Justice Sotomayor, during her
Senate confirmation hearings, fielded the significant question of her view on “how she
would use, interpret, and apply international law if confirmed”).
278
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033-34.
279
Id.
280
Id.
275
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ternational custom.
Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito joined in the dissent, proclaiming an originalist view that the drafters’ perception of cruel and
unusual punishment was “originally understood as prohibiting tortuous methods of punishment.” 281 The dissent claimed that the Constitution provided neither an indication that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause “was understood to require proportionality in
sentencing,” nor an adoption of categorical proportionality rules.282
The latter, the dissent stated, “[was] entirely the Court’s creation,”
and the former “intrude[d] upon [the] areas that the Constitution reserves to other (state and federal) organs of government.” 283 According to the dissent, if the people of a state decide, through the actions
of their elected officials, to impose a sentence of life without parole
for juvenile offenders for non-homicide offenses, then the federal
government should not prohibit such a sentence. 284
Moreover, and perhaps as an indication of the dissent’s strict
adherence to the concepts of originalism, Justice Thomas responded
to a concurring opinion of Justice Stevens that emphasized the
Court’s assertion that “evolving standards of decency” have played a
crucial role in Eighth Amendment cases. 285 Justice Stevens proclaimed, “Society changes. Knowledge accumulates. We learn,
sometimes, from our mistakes.” 286 Justice Thomas countered, “I
agree with Justice Stevens that ‘[w]e learn . . . from our mistakes.’
Perhaps one day the Court will learn from this one.” 287

281
Id. at 2044 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979) (internal citations omitted).
282
Id. at 2044-45.
283
Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2044-45.
284
Id. at 2048-50 (claiming that it was “nothing short of stunning” that the majority ignored their own evidence that thirty-seven out of fifty states permit the practice of sentencing
juveniles to life without parole, choosing instead to adopt other measures to arrive at its decision).
285
Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring).
286
Id.
287
Id. at 2058.
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CIVIL DETENTION FOR THE SEXUALLY DANGEROUS AND
MENTALLY ILL
a.

United States v. Comstock: The Meaning of
“Necessary and Proper”

Suppose a defendant, convicted of mail fraud, is sentenced to
and serves five years in the federal penitentiary. Suppose further,
that after the completion of the defendant’s sentence, the federal government petitions the court to declare the defendant sexually dangerous and the court makes such a determination. Can the federal court
then, pursuant to a federal statute, civilly commit that person indefinitely as a sexually dangerous person? According to last Term’s opinion in Comstock, 288 the answer is a definitive ‘yes.’ 289
Each of the five respondents in Comstock was convicted of
crimes of a sexual nature. 290 Solicitor General Elena Kagan, presenting the case for the United States, clearly stated that the responsibility
to assure the appropriate care and custody of sexually violent and
mentally ill people rests squarely with the government. 291 Kagan argued that if the government believes that a sexually violent or mentally ill person “will commit further offenses” after his or her release
from custody, then Congress has the power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause of the Constitution to enact legislation that allows the
government to civilly commit this person. 292 The federal statute at
issue refers to any person who is in federal custody pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 4241(d). 293 Therefore, anyone, regardless of the crime, is

288

130 S. Ct. 1949.
See id. at 1965 (holding that the statute was constitutionally authorized by Congress).
290
See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
291
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-8, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (No. 08-1124),
2010 WL 97479.
292
Id. at 11-12. Kagan argued that the Court in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362
(1997), held that, “in order to invoke civil commitment statutes[,]” the Court required “that
there be not only sexual dangerousness, but also mental illness.”
293
Title 18, Section 4241(d) of the United States Code states, in pertinent part:
If, after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or
to assist properly in his defense, the court shall commit the defendant to
the custody of the Attorney General.
289
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subject to civil commitment if the government determines that he or
she had previously engaged in child molestation or sexual violence
and has the propensity to repeat the behavior, or is mentally ill or
sexually dangerous. 294
In Comstock, five defendants challenged 18 U.S.C. § 4248, a
federal statute that effectively rendered “sexually dangerous” prisoners about to be released subject to civil commitment. 295 All five defendants had either pled guilty to or had been charged with sexrelated crimes. 296 Each of the five defendants moved to dismiss the
civil commitment proceeding prescribed by § 4248, claiming that the
proceeding was criminal and violated the prohibition against double
jeopardy, and violated their rights under both the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments. 297 The Court confined its analysis to the provisions of
the Necessary and Proper Clause, stating that “the relevant inquiry is
simply ‘whether the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power’ or under
other powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to

294
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 291, at 54. Alan DuBois, attorney for the
Petitioners, claiming that the 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (West 2010) as written was unconstitutional,
argued, “You can be in custody for any crime whatsoever. It doesn’t have to be sex-related,
you can never have been convicted of a sex offense whatsoever. So it really is, there is almost a complete de-linking of the crime which brought you into federal custody and your
subsequent commitment.” Id.
295
Title 18, Section 4248(a) and (d) of the United States Code states, in pertinent part:
(a) In relation to a person who is in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons,
or who has been committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d), or against whom all criminal charges have been
dismissed solely for reasons relating to the mental condition of the person, the Attorney General or any individual authorized by the Attorney
General or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons may certify that the person is a sexually dangerous person . . . [t]he court shall order a hearing to
determine whether the person is a sexually dangerous person . . . (d) If,
after the hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the person is a sexually dangerous person, the court shall commit the
person to the custody of the Attorney General.
296
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1955 (reporting that three of the five had pled guilty to possession of child pornography, one pled guilty to sexually abusing a minor, and one faced
charges for aggravated sexual abuse of a minor).
297
Id. They claimed that the proceeding pursuant to the statute denied them substantive
due process and equal protection, violated procedural due process because the statute provided a standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence as opposed to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the enactment of the statute exceeded Congress’ constitutionally enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id.
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implement.” 298 In finding for the government, the Court held that 18
U.S.C. § 4248 was
a “necessary and proper” means of exercising the federal authority that permits Congress to create federal
criminal laws, to punish their violation, to imprison
violators, to provide appropriately for those imprisoned, and to maintain the security of those who are
not imprisoned but who may be affected by the federal
imprisonment of others. 299
The holding for the government in Comstock, although narrow in scope, determined that Congress has broad authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution. The Court tailored
its analysis of the challenge to § 4248 by focusing on Congress’s
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause and developing a
“five-consideration” test to determine whether that power is appropriately applied. 300 Because Congress has “broad power” under the
Clause to create federal crimes to further its enumerated powers and
to ensure that these crimes are enforced—in Comstock, Congress
enacted § 4248 to ensure the safety of those who may be affected by
the release of “sexually dangerous” prisoners—Congress need only
show that the statute is reasonably related to an enumerated power.301
The following factors of the test when applied to the facts of Coms298

Id. at 1956 (reiterating its earlier point that “[the Court has] since made clear that, in
determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a
means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power” (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004)).
299
Id. at 1965. The Court established five factors in concluding that the statute was an appropriate exercise of Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause:
[The factors are] (1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2)
the long history of federal involvement in this arena [in that Congress
determined that the statute furthers a legitimate means], (3) the sound
reasons for the statute’s enactment in light of the Government’s custodial
interest in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the
statute’s narrow scope.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965.
300
See supra note 299.
301
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962. See also Anna Christenson, Broad Authority Under the
‘Necessary and Proper Clause’ Allows Federal Commitment of Sexually Dangerous Individuals, SCOTUSBLOG, (May 18, 2010 1:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=20305.
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tock— (1) Congress’s long-standing history of enacting federal criminal statutes; (2) safety of the public serving as a sound reason for its
enactment; (3) accommodation of state interests by not overriding
state sovereignty through forcing the states to civilly commit the
“sexually dangerous” offenders in state facilities; and (4) the narrowness of the statute in that it applies only to a small number of individuals—led to the Court’s decision. Further, the Court was careful to
clearly indicate that the decision was narrowly tailored, stating that
“We do not reach or decide any claim that the statute or its application denies equal protection of the laws, procedural or substantive
due process, or any other rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondents are free to pursue those claims on remand, and any others
they have preserved.” 302
Congress enacted § 4248 in 2006 as part of the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act. 303 Child molestation and sexual
abuse stand among the most heinous crimes. Further, because each
of the five respondents in Comstock committed sex-related offenses
to warrant their involvement with the federal court system, it may appear that § 4248 would logically apply to only those imprisoned for
sex-related offenses.
However, nearly twenty percent of individuals who have been
civilly committed under § 4248 (as of the time of Comstock) had not
been incarcerated for sexually related offenses. 304 Section 4248 procedurally vests in the government the power to certify any currently
incarcerated prisoner as “sexually dangerous,” allows the government
to prove its claims by clear and convincing psychiatric evidence at a
hearing, and, if proved, civilly commits the person to the custody of
the Attorney General. 305

302

Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965.
See Rodger Citron, United States v. Comstock: Will the Supreme Court Uphold the
Federal Government’s Power to Commit Sex Offenders, or Invoke Principles of Federalism,
FINDLAW (Feb. 8. 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20100208_citron.html;
see also John Holland, Adam Walsh, Case is Closed After 27 Years, LATIMES.COM (Dec. 17,
2008), http://articles.latimes.com-2008-dec-17-nation-na-adam17. On July 27, 1981, six
year old Adam Walsh disappeared from a shopping mall in Florida, and two weeks later, his
mangled and abused body was discovered. Id. His parents, John and Reve Walsh, embarked
on a three decade effort, lobbying Congress to enact the aforementioned legislation. Id.
304
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1977 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to a statistic for which
the Government conceded).
305
Id. at 1954.
303
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Background: Kansas v. Hendricks, Confinement
and Double Jeopardy

Kansas v. Hendricks, 306 like Comstock, involved issues of
child sexual abuse, but dealt with a challenge regarding alleged violations of due process, double jeopardy and the enactment of ex post
facto laws following the Respondent’s civil commitment. 307 Unlike
the statute at issue in Comstock, the statute in Hendricks specifically
applied to already incarcerated sexual predators. In Hendricks, the
defendant was already serving a prison term in Kansas for molesting
two thirteen-year-old boys and was nearing the end of his sentence. 308
Pursuant to a Kansas statute, the Sexually Violent Predator Act of
1994, 309 there was a civil commitment hearing at which Hendricks
testified that he repeatedly sexually abused children whenever he was
not confined. 310 The statute at issue provided a means for the state to
confine “sexual predators” post-release from prison. 311 At a trial to
306

521 U.S. 346.
Id. at 356.
308
Id. at 353.
309
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994). The Kansas Legislature enacted the statute to
deal with the problem of managing repeat sexual offenders upon release. Hendricks, 521
U.S. at 351-52. The Legislature, in enacting § 59-29a01, explained:
A small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to the general involuntary civil
commitment statute . . . . In contrast to persons appropriate for civil
commitment under the general involuntary civil commitment statute,
sexually violent predators generally have anti-social personality features
which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities
and those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior. The legislature further finds that sexually violent predators’ likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high.
The existing involuntary commitment procedure . . . is inadequate to address the risk these sexually violent predators pose to society. The legislature further finds that the prognosis for rehabilitating sexually violent
predators in a prison setting is poor, the treatment needs of this population are very long term and the treatment modalities for this population
are very different than the traditional treatment modalities for people appropriate for commitment under the general involuntary civil commitment statute.
Id. at 351.
310
Id. at 354-55.
311
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (defining sexually violent predator as “any person
who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the
307
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determine whether Hendricks fit the profile of a sexual predator subject to civil commitment under the statute, a jury unanimously found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks was, in fact, a sexually
violent predator. 312 After the Kansas Supreme Court held that Hendricks’ substantive due process rights were violated, the Court
granted certiorari. 313
The Court, when considering Hendricks’ due process claim,
determined that, although “freedom from physical restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause from arbitrary government action,” 314 Hendricks was appropriately found to be a pedophile under the procedures of the statute,
and his admitted “mental abnormality” of dangerousness rendered
him subject to civil commitment. 315 Therefore, the Court held that
the diagnosis of Hendricks as a “pedophile” “plainly suffices for due
process purposes.” 316
The Court then determined whether the Act violated the constitutional prohibitions of double jeopardy or ex post facto legislation,

predatory acts of sexual violence”).
The Act’s civil commitment procedures pertain[] to: (1) a presently confined person who, like Hendricks, “has been convicted of a sexually violent offense” and is scheduled for release; (2) a person who has been
“charged with a sexually violent offense” but has been found incompetent to stand trial; (3) a person who has been found “not guilty by reason
of insanity of a sexually violent offense”; and (4) a person found “not
guilty” of a sexually violent offense because of a mental disease or defect.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3221, 59-29a03(a)).
312
Id. at 355.
313
Id. at 356. The Kansas Supreme Court declared:
[I]n order to commit a person involuntarily in a civil proceeding, a State
is required by “substantive” due process to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person is both (1) mentally ill, and (2) a danger to
himself or to others. The court then determined that the Act’s definition
of “mental abnormality” did not satisfy what it perceived to be this
Court’s “mental illness” requirement in the civil commitment context.
As a result, the court held that “the Act violates Hendricks’ substantive
due process rights.”
Id. (citations omitted)
314
Id. (quoting Foucha v. United States, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
315
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 (reiterating Hendricks’ own testimony before the jury trial
that “when he becomes ‘stressed out,’ he cannot ‘control the urge’ to molest children” as
well as the plethora of psychiatric authority used to determine Hendricks’ condition).
316
Id.
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two issues left unexamined by the Kansas Supreme Court. 317 Hendricks argued that the “newly enacted” punishment prescribed by the
Act was based on past conduct for which he already served time, effectively violating the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.318
Hendricks’ double jeopardy claim arose from his assertions that the
confinement permitted by the Act was purely punitive due to its potential indefinite duration. 319 The Act also “failed to offer any ‘legitimate’ treatment,” and was procedurally criminal rather than civil.320
The Court disagreed with Hendricks and held that the commitment
prescribed by the Act is not indefinite in that “Kansas [did] not intend
an individual committed pursuant to the Act to remain confined any
longer than he suffers from a mental abnormality rendering him unable to control his dangerousness.” 321 And because the Kansas legislature took “great care to confine only a narrow class of particularly
dangerous individuals [and met] the strictest procedural standards,”
the proceeding cannot be held to be criminal. 322 Furthermore, even if
the primary purpose of the Act was confinement of sexual predators,
treatment, as an ancillary purpose, even where treatment does not yet
exist, cannot be ruled out. 323 The Court concluded that, because the
Act was civil in nature, double jeopardy could not apply, and therefore, any ex post facto claim denying the defendant notice regarding a
newly enacted statute must likewise fail. 324 Therefore, under these
317

Id. at 356.
Id. at 361.
319
Id. at 363.
320
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364-66. Hendricks’ assertion of the punitive nature of the Act
was based on his assertion that the punishment was retribution for his past crime, for which
he served. Id. at 361. Hendricks further relied on Allen v. Illinois, claiming that the “ ‘proceedings under the Act are accompanied by procedural safeguards usually found in criminal
trials.’ ” Id. at 364 (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 371 (2008)).
321
Id. Commitment under the Act is only potentially indefinite. Id. The maximum
amount of time an individual can be incapacitated pursuant to a single judicial proceeding is
one year. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364. “If Kansas seeks to continue the detention beyond
that year, a court must once again determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the detainee satisfies the same standards as required for the initial confinement.” Id.
322
Id. at 364-65 (countering Hendricks’ assertion that the proceedings were criminal in
nature by clarifying Hendricks’ reading of Allen and quoting the case—“ ‘to provide some of
the safeguards applicable in criminal trials cannot itself turn these proceedings into criminal
prosecutions’ ” (quoting Allen, 478 U.S. at 372)).
323
Id. at 366 (reasoning that “[t]o conclude otherwise would obligate a State to release
certain confined individuals who were both mentally ill and dangerous simply because they
could not be successfully treated for their afflictions”).
324
Id. at 369-70. The Court stated,
318
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circumstances, a “sexually dangerous” individual may arguably be
detained for the remainder of his or her life absent a finding that the
individual is no longer mentally impaired or sexually dangerous.
Hendricks, predating Comstock by more than a decade, 325
provided the precedent necessary to undermine any Comstock claims
of double jeopardy or ex post facto violations regarding civil commitment of previously incarcerated sexual offenders. However, there
are sharp distinctions between the two cases. The Kansas law at issue in Hendricks was a state legislative act; the law at issue in Comstock was one passed by the United States Congress. 326 Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion in Hendricks; he
authored the dissent in Comstock. 327 Perhaps the sharpest distinction
lies at the heart of the matter—the language of the statute at issue in
each of the cases. In Hendricks, the Kansas legislature confined the
civil commitment procedures to only those presently confined for
acts of sexual violence and sexual molestation. 328 The federal statute
in Comstock, prescribing civil confinement for the “sexually dangerous,” failed to distinguish between people previously incarcerated for
sexual offenses and those simply incarcerated for any federal offenses. 329

Where the State has “disavowed any punitive intent”; limited confinement to a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals; provided
strict procedural safeguards; directed that confined persons be segregated
from the general prison population and afforded the same status as others
who have been civilly committed; recommended treatment if such is
possible; and permitted immediate release upon a showing that the individual is no longer dangerous or mentally impaired, we cannot say that it
acted with punitive intent. We therefore hold that the Act does not establish criminal proceedings and that involuntary confinement pursuant
to the Act is not punitive. Our conclusion that the Act is nonpunitive
thus removes an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex post facto claims.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69.
325
See id. at 346; see also Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1949.
326
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350; Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1954.
327
Hendricks, 521 U.S, at 350; Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(specifically bringing attention to the fact that only twenty percent of those presently civilly
confined had been in prison for sexually related offenses).
328
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352 (defining the parameters of the statute’s confinement
procedures).
329
See supra note 294.
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V.

FOR WHOM THE AEDPA TOLLS: EXTREME LAWYER
MISCONDUCT AND EQUITABLE TOLLING

“This Court should fashion a remedy that would avoid the
shocking result that Petitioner should suffer the consequences of such
extreme lawyer misconduct.” 330 “The misconduct of Petitioner’s
former counsel constitutes substantially more than ‘gross negligence’
and, under the law governing lawyers, represents intolerable, thoroughly unacceptable behavior.” 331 “The Court is also confronted
with a lawyer who perpetrated a fraud on the lawyer’s client and at
the same time abandoned the client’s cause without notice or court
permission.” 332 These statements prepared for the Brief of Legal Ethics Professors and Practitioners and the Stein Center for Law and
Ethics as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner represent the level of
disdain for the conduct of the Petitioner’s counsel that became the focus of the Petitioner’s claim in Holland v. Florida. 333
The issue in Holland was whether the one-year period of limitations prescribed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 334 can be tolled for equitable reasons—in
Holland, the Petitioner claimed that his counsel’s professional misconduct constituted “equitable reasons.” 335 The AEDPA provides
that “a [one]-year period of limitation shall apply to an application
330
Brief of Legal Ethics Professors and Practitioners and the Stein Center for Law and
Ethics as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9, Holland, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (No. 095327), 2009 WL 5177143 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
331
Id.
332
Id. at 12. The Brief for Petitioner embodied an overtone of reprehensibility in regards
to the conduct of the Petitioner’s counsel.
[C]ourts often view failure by a lawyer to fulfill that duty by a negligence standard—a garden variety failure to meet the standard of care—
that would not give rise to an entitlement of the client to escape the damaging consequences of the lawyer’s conduct. Yet that is not what happened here. There was no mere lapse in the standard of care. Rather,
this Court is presented with several fundamental breaches of the most
sacred duties lawyers owe their clients, duties that long pre-date any
lawyer codes, duties that courts have enshrined in the foundations of
agency law (the roots of much of the law governing lawyers), duties that
have been only strengthened over time as the courts have applied them to
the lawyer-client relationship.
Id.
333
130 S. Ct. 2549.
334
28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d) (West 2010).
335
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2554.
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for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court.” 336 It also provides that “the time during
which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under
this subsection.” 337 In other words, once a Petitioner properly files an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, the limitations clock is suspended, or tolled, and remains suspended, pending disposition of the
petition.
Holland was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced
to death in 1997. 338 After a series of appeals which were denied by
the Supreme Court, the AEDPA limitation clock for Holland began;
the date was October 1, 2001. 339 On September 19, 2002 (twelve
days before the limitations clock expired), state-appointed attorney
Bradley Collins (appointed by Florida on November 7, 2001) filed a
motion for post-conviction relief in the Florida courts. 340 The clock
then stopped, and for three years, Holland’s petition remained untouched. 341
At the time Collins eventually argued Holland’s case before
the Florida Supreme Court in February 2005, the attorney-client relationship between Collins and Holland had begun to deteriorate.342
Although Holland memorialized his complaints regarding Collins’s
lack of communication in requests to have new counsel appointed,
Holland’s requests were eventually denied. 343 Further, Holland specifically wrote to Collins reminding the attorney that if the Florida
Supreme Court denied his appeal, there were only twelve days remaining on the AEDPA limitation clock for filing in federal court. 344
Collins never replied, the Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the
lower court, and the limitations clock eventually expired; Holland
was unaware of both the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling and the
336

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (d)(1).
Id. § 2244(d)(2).
338
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
339
Id.
340
Id. (recognizing that Collins was appointed by the State of Florida on November 7,
2001 to represent Holland in his appeal).
341
Id.
342
Id.
343
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555-56.
344
Id. at 2256.
337
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clock’s running out. 345
The timeline of events following the Florida Supreme Court’s
ruling form the basis for Holland’s complaint (and Amicus Curiae’s
consternation 346 ) regarding Collins’s lack of professional ethics.
When Holland learned of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, he
immediately filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida. 347 Collins finally responded to Holland, claiming that he intended to file a petition, but
that the statute clock had run out six years prior when Holland’s
judgment and sentence were originally denied by the Florida state
court and before Collins ever represented Holland; it turned out, Collins misinterpreted the law. 348 Collins’s response was his final communication with Holland, and, contrary to Collins’s assertion, he had
never filed a petition on Holland’s behalf. 349
The district court eventually dismissed Collins, appointed a
new attorney, and proceedings ensued to determine whether the circumstances of Holland’s case regarding Collins’s representation warranted equitable tolling. 350 The district court held that the facts did
not necessitate such equitable tolling. 351 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Collins’s performance constituted “pure negligence,” but agreed with Holland that “equitable tolling can be applied to AEDPA’s statutory deadline.” 352 The Supreme
345

Id. at 2256-57.
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 330, at 9.
347
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2557.
348
Id. at 2557-58. Holland responded to Collins’s letter asserting that the AEDPA clock
had run expressing his displeasure with Collins’ representation and imploring Collins to file
his habeas petition “at once.” Id. at 2557-58.
349
Id. at 2559.
350
Id. Holland petitioned the federal court to determine whether Collins’ actions warranted a valid reason to consider the limitations clock suspended while Collins represented
him. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2559.
351
Id.
352
Id. at 2559-60. On the matter of Collins’s performance, the Eleventh Circuit stated
that “such behavior can never constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ ” to warrant equitable tolling. Id. at 2559. The court wrote:
We will assume that Collins’s alleged conduct is negligent, even grossly
negligent. But in our view, no allegation of lawyer negligence or of failure to meet a lawyer’s standard of care—in the absence of an allegation
and proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or
so forth on the lawyer’s part—can rise to the level of egregious attorney
misconduct that would entitle Petitioner to equitable tolling.
Id. at 2559-60.
346
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Court, seeking to resolve a circuit split on the “application of the
equitable tolling doctrine to professional instances of conduct,”
granted certiorari. 353
The Court first determined whether “AEDPA’s statutory limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons.” 354 In concluding
that the AEDPA is “subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases,”
the Court held that the statute “does not set forth ‘an inflexible rule
requiring dismissal whenever’ its ‘clock has run,’ ” 355 and is “normally subject to a ‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor of ‘equitable tolling.’ ” 356 The Court further explained that although Congress incorporated no provision in the statute for equitable tolling, the fact that
Congress included tolling in the statute only in reference to pending
state claims does not indicate its intent to preclude equitable tolling. 357 The Court also disagreed with the Respondent’s assertion
that equitable tolling undermines the AEDPA’s basic purposes 358 by
stating that when Congress codified the statute, it did so with the intent to preserve the vital role that “the writ of habeas corpus plays . . .
in protecting constitutional rights.” 359
The Court then proceeded to determine whether the type of alleged attorney misconduct present in Holland warranted equitable
tolling. The Court stated that “We have previously made clear that a
‘petitioner’ is ‘entitled to equitable tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that
he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraor353

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560.
Id.
355
Id. (quoting Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006)).
356
Id. (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1996)).
357
Id. (referring to and rejecting the maxim “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (to include one item . . .) is to exclude other similar items”).
358
Transcript of Oral Argument at 43-45, Holland, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (No. 09-5327), 2010
WL 710522 (referring to a “pre-AEDPA mentality” that “there must be a remedy” and that
“there must be some equity done,” but that it was not the intent of Congress in enacting the
AEDPA to have cases linger in the system for years).
359
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562. The Court, in finding that Congress, in enacting Section
2244, “did not seek to end every possible delay at all costs.” Id. at 2562.
The importance of the Great Writ, the only writ explicitly protected by
the Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, along with congressional efforts to
harmonize the new statute with prior law, counsels hesitancy before interpreting AEDPA’s statutory silence as indicating a congressional intent
to close courthouse doors that a strong equitable claim would ordinarily
keep open.
Id.
354
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dinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” 360 The Court examined the decisions by both the lower district
court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, disagreeing with
both decisions, but for different reasons. 361 The district court based
its ruling on whether Collins demonstrated a “lack of diligence,” as
opposed to the attorney’s behavior meriting an “extraordinary circumstance;” 362 “the diligence required for equitable tolling purposes
is “ ‘reasonable diligence.’ ” 363 In Holland, the Court, in questioning
the district court’s finding, seemed to assert that Collins’s professional conduct fell short of reasonable diligence. 364 Then, examining the
strict rule set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in determining whether a
lawyer’s misconduct rises to the level of an “extraordinary circumstance,” 365 the Court reasoned that the circuit court’s approach was
“overly rigid”; 366 “several lower courts have . . . held that unprofessional attorney conduct may, in certain circumstances, prove ‘egregious’ and can be ‘extraordinary’ even though the conduct in question may not satisfy the Eleventh Circuit’s [strict] rule.” 367
However, in the end, although the Court determined that
equitable tolling is available under the AEDPA, it provided no clear
indication regarding the disposition of Holland’s case. 368 In the
Court’s view, the district court erred when it originally decided that
Collins’s alleged misconduct for the purposes of equitable tolling was
based on the attorney’s lack of diligence. 369 The Court of Appeals
standard was “overly rigid.” 370 The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit decision and remanded the case, requiring the appeals court to
conduct a possible “equitable, fact intensive” inquiry to determine
whether the government should prevail.371

360

Id.
See id.
362
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565.
363
Id. (quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 326 (2006)).
364
See id. (insinuating that the actions and inactions taken by Collins during his representation of Holland amounted to a lack of diligence).
365
Id. at 2563-64
366
Id. at 2565.
367
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563-64.
368
Id. at 2565.
369
Id.
370
Id.
371
Id.
361
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CONCLUSION

The 2009-2010 Term of the Supreme Court presented several
important issues regarding criminal matters and constitutional jurisprudence. Skilling revealed that a change of venue based on a claim
of a “tainted jury pool,” even in one of the most publicized cases of
the last several years, presents a difficult, if not impossible task, for a
criminal defendant. Both Padilla and Holland, similar cases in that
they examined issues involving ineffective assistance of counsel,
were remanded to the lower courts for re-examination. The Court
neither offered clarity regarding the meaning of prejudice in determining ineffective assistance of counsel nor provided an ascertainable definition of attorney misconduct. However, Padilla expanded
the Sixth Amendment by specifically determining that deportation is
a consequence unique in nature because of the substantial impact on
the lives of non-citizens. Now, criminal defense attorneys bear the
burden of being aware of immigration issues that might impact their
clients. The question will surely arise as to whether Padilla strictly
applies only to deportation or whether the Sixth Amendment will further expand to other criminal matters. Holland clearly determined
that the time limitations imposed by Congress in the AEDPA are subject to equitable tolling. Graham held that a sentence of life in prison
without the possibility of parole is cruel and unusual when the sentence is imposed on a minor for the commission of a non-homicidal
offense. Comstock presented the Court with the opportunity to expound on the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Court
determined that Congress, under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
had the authority to enact legislation to civilly commit sexually dangerous people. Overall, during the last Term, the Court left defense
attorneys in awe of their newfound obligations, expanded the constitutional authority vested in Congress, settled circuit splits, provided
defendants with constitutional remedies and protections, and clearly
indicated that even a substantial amount of publicity alone surrounding a trial does not necessarily warrant a change of venue.

